When working with joint collections of confidential data from multiple sources, e.g., in cloud-based multi-party computation scenarios, the ownership relation between data providers and their inputs itself is confidential information. Protecting data providers' privacy desires a function for secretly shuffling the data collection. We present the first efficient secure multi-party computation protocol for secret shuffling in scenarios with a central server. Based on a novel approach to random index distribution, our solution enables the randomization of the order of a sequence of encrypted data such that no observer can map between elements of the original sequence and the shuffled sequence with probability better than guessing. It allows for shuffling data encrypted under an additively homomorphic cryptosystem with constant round complexity and linear computational complexity. Being a general-purpose protocol, it is of relevance for a variety of practical use cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an industrial context, security against semi-honest adversaries [26] is a valid assumption as companies typically have a financial and legal interest in the correct execution of processes. Proactive misbehaviour or negligent data handling could lead to a loss of reputation or legal consequences, such as those imposed by the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [30] .
To make well-informed business decisions, companies need to determine their strengths and weaknesses. One widely-used measure is cross-company benchmarking. In cross-company benchmarking, companies compare their key performance indicators (KPI), e.g., return on investment, to those of other companies of the same industry. As results, they obtain statistical measures, such as quartiles and mean. To compute rank-based statistical measures like quartiles, sorting KPIs typically is an important aspect of benchmarking. However, as the companies' performances are confidential, no company should learn another company's KPIs. Instead, benchmark results should only help them determine how they perform relatively to their overall peer group. To ensure that, benchmarks typically are performed by trusted third parties (TTP), neutral companies that take the companies' KPIs in plaintext and centrally compute the statistical measures. However, using a TTP requires trust. On the one hand, companies need to trust that the TTP does not proactively abuse the companies' private KPIs. As described above, this is a valid assumption as the neutral party has a financial and legal interest in honest behavior. However, on the other hand, they need to trust that the TTP implements sufficient security measures that prevent data breaches. This is an important drawback of the TTP approach as data breaches might cost companies their competitive advantage or reputation.
Alternatively, benchmarking could be performed via secure multi-party computation (MPC) [15] . An MPC protocol emulates a TTP by having the parties, e.g., companies, jointly evaluate some public function, e.g., quartile computation, over their inputs. Most importantly, those inputs are kept private, e.g., processed in an encrypted form. Such a protocol is secure in the sense that parties only learn their own inputs, their outputs, and what can be inferred from that. Hence, confidential KPIs are protected from any internal and external observer, enabling privacy-preserving benchmarking. We restrict our considerations to MPC scenarios where n parties each contribute confidential inputs and jointly evaluate the target function with a service provider. We refer to the data providers as players and require the service provider to be a single, central instance (see Fig. 1 ).
As the core of a benchmarking MPC protocol, encrypted KPIs need to be sorted according to their underlying plaintexts in a privacy-preserving fashion. This can be done via sorting networks in up to n log n comparisons orchestrated by a service provider as described in [21] . However, this would cause the service provider to learn the order of the confidential KPIs, that is, how a particular company performs relatively to another particular company. Even if the service provider is assumed to not misuse this information proactively, a data breach could leak this confidential performance information.
To reduce the risk of benchmarks leaking confidential data and relative performance information, an efficient privacypreserving benchmarking protocol based on MPC should ensure anonymity in the sense that no observer can infer ownership relations between companies and their encrypted KPIs. This can be done by secretly shuffling the encrypted KPIs prior to benchmarking. We refer to a secret shuffle as a function that randomizes the order of a sequence of encrypted inputs such that no observer can map elements Preventing such a mapping also implies a need for changing the ciphertexts without affecting the underlying plaintexts.
Besides privacy-preserving benchmarking, our protocol can be applied to any scenario where n players send encrypted inputs to a central service provider, e.g., a cloud service, without it learning which player provided which input. This includes use cases such as anonymous surveys, polls, and voting. Before we present our shuffling protocol in Section IV, we introduce required definitions and preliminaries and give an overview of related work. In Sections V and VI, we prove input privacy and correctness, respectively, before we evaluate the complexity and performance of our protocol in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We restrict our considerations to asymmetric cryptosystems, i.e., a tuple CS = (G, E, D) consisting of three polynomialtime algorithms. The probabilistic key-generation algorithm G takes as input a security parameter κ and outputs a key pair (pk, sk) consisting of a public encryption key pk and a secret decryption key sk. The probabilistic encryption algorithm E takes as input a plaintext x ∈ M and pk and outputs the ciphertext y = E(x, pk) ∈ C. M and C denote the plaintext and ciphertext space, respectively. The decryption algorithm D takes as input a ciphertext y ∈ C and sk and outputs the plaintext x = D(y, sk) ∈ M. For simplification, we denote the encryption of x ∈ M i under a cryptosystem CS i = (G i , E i , D i ) for pk i by y = E i (x) and the decryption of y ∈ C i for sk i by x = D i (y).
Homomorphic cryptosystems, such as RSA [31] , Paillier's [28] , and BGV [4] , allow for computations on ciphertexts. A cryptosystem CS is homomorphic if applying an operation • to ciphertexts E(x 1 ) and E(x 2 ) yields the ciphertext E(y) of the result y = x 1 * x 2 of a corresponding homomorphic operation * applied to the plaintexts x 1 and x 2 [22] . That is, E(x 1 ) • E(x 2 ) = E(x 1 * x 2 ). We restrict our considerations to cryptosystems with an additive homomorphism enabling addition of the underlying plaintexts as depicted in (1) and (2) , such as Paillier's cryptosystem [28] .
That is, multiplication of ciphertexts encrypted under the same key pk yields an encryption of the sum of the underlying plaintexts, encrypted under pk. This enables multiplication of an encrypted value by a plaintext value via exponentiation.
Paillier's cryptosystem allows for rerandomization [28] . Given pk and a ciphertext E(x) of a plaintext x, rerandomization is an operation that computes a valid ciphertext E ′ (x) without decryption. With high probability, E(x) = E ′ (x) is ensured such that the output distributions of rerandomization and encryption are computationally indistinguishable [14] . For Paillier's cryptosystem, it can be performed by multiplication with the encrypted identity element 0 as depicted in (3) [28] .
A hash function h(·) is a function that, for arbitrarily long inputs x, computes outputs h(x) of fixed length [20] . It is easy to compute h(x), called hash [21] . A hash function is cryptographic if it provides pre-image resistance and collisionresistance. The former guarantees that it is computationally infeasible to compute x given only h(x) [21] . The latter ensures that it is computationally infeasible to find two hashes
We define a sequence S as an enumeration of elements s i that are arranged in a particular order. Multiple s i can have the same value. The number of s i in S is referred to as its length. We only use finite sequences of fixed length n and denote them either by S = (s 1 , ..., s n ) or by S = (..., s i , ...) depending on whether we want to emphasize the elements' order or their form. Given S = (s 1 , ..., s n ), a random permutation π : S → S ′ is a permutation that is chosen uniformly at random from the set of permutations on sequences of length n [20] . It yields the permuted sequence S ′ = (..., s i , ...|s i ∈ S) containing the same n elements as S but in a randomly permuted order. We denote the position of s i in S ′ permuted via π by π(s i ).
A function ϕ(m) is called negligible in m if for every polynomial p(m) there is an m 0 ∈ N such that for any m > m 0 , ϕ(m) ≤ 1 p(m) applies [20] . Let X 1 m m∈N and X 2 m m∈N be two sets of random variables. If for a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A the advantage
is negligible in m, the two sets are computationally indistinguishable [20] . In [18] , a shuffle of a sequence of ciphertexts is defined as a sequence of different ciphertexts of the same plaintexts, arranged in a permuted order. We additionally require the permutation to be secret and define a secret shuffle as follows.
Definition 1 (Secret Shuffle). Given a sequence of ciphertexts X = (..., E(x i ), ...) with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A secret shuffle S(·) is a function that, for input X, yields a sequence X = (..., E ′ (x π(i) ), ...) such that the ciphertexts E ′ (x 1 ) = E(x 1 ), ..., E ′ (x n ) = E(x n ) have the same plaintexts x 1 , ..., x n . The order of the elements in X is randomly permuted via a random permutation π. No participant can learn more than negligibly much information about π.
III. RELATED WORK
A. Approaches with Additional (Neutral) Instances
In [6] , Chaum introduces mix networks, a protocol that enables anonymity and unlinkability of messages to their senders at the cost of additional computational overhead. Mix networks involve a sequence of servers, called mixes, which receive a set of messages, shuffle, and forward them to the next mix [18] . Unlinkability is guaranteed if at least one mix is honest [18] . There are two kinds of shuffles: decryption and re-encryption shuffles [1] . In decryption shuffles, the messages are layered ciphertexts. Each mix removes one layer of encryption from each message and sorts the resulting plaintexts. In re-encryption shuffles, the mixes rerandomize and permute the messages via a randomly chosen permutation. A re-encryption mix network that ensures simplified key management based on universal re-encryption is given in [17] . In [32] , the first mix network that is universally composable and efficient independent of the number of mixes is presented. The first efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for proving that a mix shuffled correctly is proposed in [19] . A description of how the permutation used by a mix can be constructed by multiple parties is given in [10] .
Unfortunately, mix networks cannot be used in the described scenario to ensure unlinkability between players and their inputs due to several drawbacks. Most importantly, mixes need to be provided by different, independent parties [29] . This cannot be guaranteed in scenarios with a single, central service provider. The same applies to Riffle [24] , an alternative to mix networks.
B. Approaches Based on Trusted Hardware
Alternatively, unlinkability can be achieved by shuffling in trusted hardware, e.g., Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [8] . Generating and applying the random permutation as well as rerandomization can be done inside trusted hardware on the service-provider side. Such an approach is described in [13] for database access pattern obfuscation. In [11] , an approach with a trusted unit with limited private memory performing shuffling of encrypted data is given. An architecture for privacy-preserving online analysis of client data based on trusted hardware is presented in [2] . In setups with a trusted CPU but no trusted memory, oblivious RAM (ORAM) can ensure that untrustworthy RAM does not leak confidential information [16] .
However, these approaches imply different trust assumptions and relations such as trust in the manufacturing of the trusted hardware. Therefore, they are not suitable for our scenario with distrusting participants.
C. Approaches Based on Secure Multi-party Computation
One approach to secure multi-party computation is secret sharing. In [25] , three shuffling MPC protocols are proposed for the Sharemind secure computation platform, focusing on low communication and round complexity. In Sharemind, computation is done by three independent parties [3] . This does not fit our scenario with a single, central service provider. Another shuffling protocol based on secret sharing is presented in [27] . However, it is designed for decentralized settings.
Secure multi-party computation can also be based on homomorphic encryption. In [5] , such an MPC protocol for shuffling data in a setting of multiple data providers and one data miner is proposed. It emulates a mix network in the sense that each data provider itself acts as a mix. Hence, it does not require independent mix servers. With its quadratic computational and linear round complexity, it does not scale well.
A protocol for shuffling based on secret sharing and homomorphic encryption is proposed in [23] . It is used as a subprotocol to anonymizes players' inputs prior to decentralized sorting and benchmarking. The ownership relation is concealed in a multi-round protocol where mix networks are used to ensure anonymity. Hence, it has drawbacks similar to those of mix networks. A constant-round benchmarking protocol for centralized scenarios based on homomorphic encryption is presented in [21] . Instead of sorting the full list of encrypted KPIs, it computes in a privacy-preserving fashion for each input the number of inputs that are smaller, such that no participant learns any KPI's rank. Even though this approach does not require shuffling to prevent leaking KPIs' ranks, it comes at the cost of quadratic computational and communication complexity, which implies poor scalability.
IV. SECRET SHUFFLING PROTOCOL

A. Adversary Model
We design our protocol to be secure against any semi-honest adversary A [26] that corrupts either an arbitrary number of players or the service provider. That is, we exclude collusion between any player and the service provider, like the related work. Our shuffling protocol ensures input privacy. Hence, A does not learn anything about non-corrupted players' secret inputs. Most importantly, we ensure that no such A is able to map non-corrupted players' inputs to their equivalents in the shuffled sequence generated by the shuffling protocol. In summary, no adversary corrupting either any subset of the players or the service provider can determine the ownership relation between non-corrupted players or their secret inputs.
B. Prerequisites
In the description of our protocol SHUFFLE, we use the indices 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n for players P i and P j , respectively, as well as their inputs x i (x j ), random values r i (r j ), etc. We denote concatenation by "||".
We assume two instances CS 1 and CS 2 of the DamgÃ¥rd-Jurik cryptosystem [9] , like Paillier's [28] . The public keys pk 1 and pk 2 are known to the service provider P S and the players P i . The secret key sk 1 is known only to the players and could be generated and distributed via Diffie-Hellman key exchange [12] . The secret key sk 2 is only known to P S . We require the plaintext space M 2 of CS 2 to be a subset of the plaintext space M 1 of CS 1 , i.e.,
This ensures that any message that can be encrypted with pk 2 can also be encrypted with pk 1 . We require two random permutations π 1 and π 2 , a cryptographic hash function h(·), and two functions sort(S) and position(S, s i ). The permutations π 1 and π 2 are both chosen Step Computation
by and only known to P S . The hashes of h(·) are assumed to be uniformly distributed among the domain dom(h(·)). Given a sequence S = (s 1 , ..., s n ), sort(S) outputs a sequence S ′ that contains s 1 , ..., s n in ascending order, as in (6) and (7).
The function position(S, s i ) outputs the position of s i in S. Moreover, we assume pairwise secure, i.e., secret and authentic, channels between each player and the service provider, for instance established via Transport Layer Security (TLS).
C. Protocol Specification
According to Definition 1, for a protocol to secretly shuffle a sequence, it has to permute the order of the entries by a random permutation π. Furthermore, it has to change the ciphertexts of the secret inputs such that π cannot be reconstructed. To achieve this, each player performs two main tasks: randomly but uniquely selecting some player's encrypted input and rerandomizing (see Equation (3)) this input. The former is based on a novel approach to random index distribution. For this random index distribution, each player provides a random input, which is concatenated with a random value given by the service provider. The resulting concatenations are then hashed and the hashes are sorted. The position of the hash in the sorted list of hashes corresponding to a player's random input is its random index. Our protocol runs in two communication rounds. The first round is used for collecting the players' inputs and the second round conducts the actual shuffling. It is depicted in Table I and explained in Section IV-D.
D. Protocol Explanation
In step 1.1, each player sends its private input x i that is supposed to be shuffled, encrypted under CS 1 . Then, in step 1.2, each player chooses a (presumably unique) random value r 1i ∈ M 1 and sends it to P S , encrypted under CS 1 . This random value will be used for random index distribution. Hence, the service provider receives two list of n ciphertexts.
The service provider then, in step 2.1, sends the full list R ′ 1 of encrypted random values E 1 (r 1i ) to the players. Permutation via π 1 prevents the players from learning which r 1i was provided by which player. Similarly, in step 2.2, it sends the full list of encrypted input values E 1 (x i ), permuted via π 2 . To prevent the players from learning the secret inputs, each plaintext x π2(i) is blinded by a value r 2i ∈ M 1 , chosen individually and at random for each i by the service provider. The full list of random values r 2i , encrypted under CS 2 , is sent to the players in step 2.3. Then, P S chooses one long random value r 1S , e.g., r 1S ∈ M 1 , and sends it to the players in step 2.4. Hence, the players receive the same three lists of n ciphertexts and the same random value.
In step 2.5, each P i decrypts the ciphertexts
If the values r ′ 1j are not unique, the players abort the protocol. Otherwise, each player concatenates each resulting plaintext r ′ 1j with the random value r 1S of P S and computes the n hashes h j . Using r 1S as a seed of the hash function prevents any player P i from selecting a specific r 1i in step 1.2 to obtain a desired hash h i , which would eventually affect the (random) index distribution. In step 2.6, each P i sorts the list of hashes. For the hash h i = h(r i ||r PS ) corresponding to player P i 's random value r 1i , the position ρ i in the sorted list of hashes is the random index of P i . Hence, each player computes an individual, random index ρ i that is unknown to P S and not related to the rank of its input x i .
Given ρ i , each player sends the ciphertext E 1 (x ′ ρi + r 2ρ i ) to P S in step 2.7. To prevent the service provider from learning ρ i , this ciphertext is rerandomized. Additionally, in step 2.8, the encrypted random value of index ρ i in R 2 , i.e., E 2 (r 2i ), is sent to P S . The underlying plaintext r 2i is blinded by a random value r 3i . This random value r 3i , encrypted under CS 1 , is then sent to P S in step 2.9. Hence, the service provider receives three ciphertexts from each player.
In step 2.10, the service provider decrypts the ciphertexts E 2 (r 2ρi + r 3i ) received in step 2.8, multiplies the resulting plaintexts with −1, and encrypts the products under cryptosystem CS 1 . The resulting ciphertexts are multiplied with the ciphertexts E 1 (x ′ ρi + r 2ρ i ) of step 2.7 and E 1 (r 3i ) of step 2.9. Consequently, the random values r 2i and r 3i are eliminated, resulting in rerandomized ciphertexts χ i = E 1 (x ′ ρi ). The order of the rerandomized ciphertexts χ i of the input values x i is determined by the input order of the values in steps 2.7 to 2.9 as received via network. Every P i sends some P j 's rerandomized, encrypted input, chosen based on its random index. The service provider cannot map between the original input order and the order of X . Therefore, P S 's output is a shuffled list. The players do not get an output.
V. PROOF OF INPUT PRIVACY
We denote privacy by a tuple (a, b), stating that a players or (exclusively) b service providers can be corrupted without input privacy being at risk. We prove that the players' inputs in the protocol SHUFFLE are (t, 1)-private against semi-honest adversaries A. This is formalized as follows.
., x n ) in the semi-honest model as long as there is no collusion between any player and the service provider.
First, we define the view of a participant as follows [15] .
For a secure computation protocol to be secure in the semi-honest model, it is sufficient to prove that anything an adversary A can learn during protocol execution can as well be learned given only the inputs and outputs of the protocol [26] . That is, it is sufficient to show that the view of A can be generated by some polynomial-time algorithm S, called simulator, entirely based on the inputs and outputs of the t corrupted players or the exclusively corrupted service provider. This can be formalized as follows [15] . 
., x n ) if there exists a polynomial-time simulator S that, given the corrupted participants' inputs and output, generates an output that is computationally indistinguishable from V I (x 1 , ..., x n ) for any I, i.e.,
a) Proof Outline: Our protocol has two different kinds of participants: n players with an input but no output and one service provider with no input but an output. Hence, we have two different views that need to be simulated by two different simulators. They simulate the protocol inputs by taking the inputs from the real protocol execution and simulate the coin tosses by using the same pseudo-random generator (PRG) as in the real protocol execution. This results in a simplified view that only contains the messages m i k , which the corrupted participants receive. We prove our protocol to 1-privately compute the shuffling functionality f in case an adversary A corrupts only the service provider. Additionally, we prove that the protocol SHUFFLE t-privately computes f in case an adversary A corrupts t players but not the service provider. This leads to the two Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 1 (Input Privacy -Players). The protocol SHUFFLE t-privately computes the shuffled sequence X = (E ′ 1 (x π(1) ), ..., E ′ 1 (x π(n) )) from the input sequence (x 1 , ..., x n ) for semi-honest adversaries that corrupt t players but not the service provider.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 1 gives the players' view and simulator. Then, the computational indistinguishability of the view and the simulator's output is shown.
Each player P i provides as input a secret value x i and does not get an output. The players have the secret decryption key sk 1 and can decrypt any ciphertext c j = E 1 (x j ). An arrow "→" shows the corresponding plaintexts that the players can compute given sk 1 . Each P i receives the following messages in the respective protocol steps.
If a message can be decrypted, the players' simulator S Pi simulates the underlying plaintext. Encryption can be regarded as a deterministic mapping of probability distributions [21] . Hence, if the computationally indistinguishable simulation of a plaintext is possible, so is the computationally indistinguishable simulation of the corresponding ciphertext. Given that dom(·) denotes the domain of a function, the players' simulator S Pi generates the following simulated messages.
2.1 n random values r 2.11 , ..., r 2.1n , uniformly chosen from dom(D 1 (·)) = M 1 2.2 n random values r 2.21 , ..., r 2.2n , uniformly chosen from dom(D 1 (·)) = M 1 2.3 n random values r 2.31 , ..., r 2.3n , uniformly chosen from dom(E 2 (·)) = C 2 2.4 A random value r 2.4 , uniformly chosen from dom(D 1 (·)) = M 1 We show that the simulator's output and the players' view are computationally indistinguishable. To prove computational indistinguishability of a real and a simulated message, one needs to show that the probability distribution of the real message is known to the simulator and that the function generating the simulated output is identically distributed [21] . In step 2.1, the values sent are the random values that were uniformly chosen by the players in step 1.2 from dom(D 1 (·)) = M 1 and encrypted with pk 1 . The players can decrypt these messages, resulting in the original random values. The values generated by the simulator, which are chosen uniformly at random from M 1 = dom(D 1 (·)), are identically distributed. In step 2.2, the values sent are sums of the players' secret inputs and random values that were uniformly chosen by the service provider from M 1 = dom(D 1 (·)) and encrypted with pk 1 . The players can decrypt these messages, resulting in the original sums with one summand being a uniformly chosen random number. Hence, they are identically distributed to the simulator's output, which are values chosen uniformly at random from M 1 = dom(D 1 (·)). The message of step 2.3 cannot be decrypted by P i . The DamgÃ¥rdâC"Jurik cryptosystem ensures semantic security [9] . Hence, ciphertexts are computationally indistinguishable from values that are chosen uniformly at random from the ciphertext space. The real messages in dom(E 2 (·)) = C 2 are computationally indistinguishable from the simulator's outputs, chosen uniformly at random from dom(E 2 (·)) = C 2 . In step 2.4, the real message is a value that was chosen uniformly at random from dom(D 1 (·)) = M 1 . The simulator's output, chosen uniformly at random from dom(D 1 (·)) = M 1 , and the real message are identically distributed. Given these comparisons, the described simulator for the players generates an output that is computationally indistinguishable from real views. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 (Input Privacy -Service Provider). The protocol SHUFFLE 1-privately computes the shuffled sequence X = (E ′ 1 (x π(1) ), ..., E ′ 1 (x π(n) )) from the input sequence (x 1 , ..., x n ) for semi-honest adversaries that corrupt the service provider.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 2 gives the service provider's view and simulator. Then, the computational indistinguishability of the view and the simulator's output is shown.
The service provider P S does not have an input. Its output are the permuted, rerandomized encryptions of the players' inputs. It knows the secret decryption key sk 2 and can decrypt any c j = E 2 (x j ). An arrow "→" shows the plaintexts that it can compute given sk 2 . It receives the following messages.
If a message can be decrypted, the service provider's simulator S PS simulates the underlying plaintext. It generates the following simulated messages.
A random value r , uniformly chosen from
dom(E 1 (·)) = C 1 1.2 A random value r 1.2 , uniformly chosen from dom(E 1 (·)) = C 1 2.7 A random value r 2.7 , uniformly chosen from dom(E 1 (·)) = C 1 2.8 A random value r 2.8 , uniformly chosen from dom(D 2 (·)) = M 2 2.9 A random value r 2.9 , uniformly chosen from dom(E 1 (·)) = C 1 We show that the simulator's output and the service provider's views are computationally indistinguishable. The messages of steps 1.1, 1.2, 2.7, and 2.9 are ciphertexts in dom(E 1 (·)) = C 1 , which cannot be decrypted by P S . Based on the semantic security of the DamgÃ¥rdâC"Jurik cryptosystem, the real messages are computationally indistinguishable from the simulator's output, which are random values uniformly chosen from dom(E 1 (·)) = C 1 . In step 2.8, the value sent is the sum of a player's secret input and a random value that was chosen by P i uniformly from M 2 = dom(D 2 (·)) and encrypted with pk 2 . The service provider can decrypt this message, resulting in the original sum with one summand being a uniformly chosen random number. Therefore, it is identically distributed to the simulator's output, which is a value chosen uniformly at random from M 2 = dom(D 2 (·)). Given these comparisons, the described simulator for the service provider generates an output that is computationally indistinguishable from real views. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
VI. PROOF OF CORRECTNESS
Correctness of our protocol is shown by proving Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 (Correctness). The protocol SHUFFLE conducts a secret shuffle of the n players' encrypted inputs. That is, for every sequence of ciphertexts X = (..., E 1 (x i ), ...) with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the protocol SHUFFLE yields as output a sequence X = (..., E ′ 1 (x π(i) ), ...) such that the ciphertexts E ′ 1 (x i ) = E 1 (x i ) have the same plaintexts x i , but their order in X is randomly permuted by a permutation π. The permutation π is not known to any participant as long as there is no collusion between any player and the service provider.
To improve readability of the proof of correctness, we split Theorem 2 into the three Lemmas according to the properties of a secret shuffle as given in Definition 1, which we will prove separately. First, we will prove that the protocol SHUFFLE outputs a randomly permuted sequence (Lemma 3). Then, we show that the ciphertexts in the output sequence are different from those of the input sequence but encrypt the same plaintexts (Lemma 4). We complete the proof of correctness by proving that no participant learns the overall, random permutation (Lemma 7).
A. Randomly Permuted Ciphertexts
Lemma 3 (Randomly Permuted Ciphertexts). The ciphertexts in sequence X = (..., E ′ 1 (x π(i) ), ...) output by the protocol SHUFFLE are permuted compared to the ciphertexts in the input sequence X = (..., E 1 (x i ), ...) with a random permutation π.
We prove Lemma 3 by showing that the encrypted inputs sent in step 2.7 are selected based on unique, random indices.
Proof. The order of sequence X = (..., E 1 (x i ), ...) is determined by the order in which the service provider P S receives these inputs (step 1.1). The order of sequence X ′ = (..., E 1 (x π2(i) +r 2i ), ...) is determined by the random permutation π 2 (step 2.2). The order of sequence R = (..., E 1 (r 1i ), ...) is determined by the order in which the service provider P S receives these inputs (step 1.2). The order of sequence R ′ = (..., E 1 (r 1 π 1 (i) ), ...) is determined by the random permutation π 1 (step 2.1) . The values r 1i and r PS (step 2.4) are chosen uniformly at random and known to each player. Starting from step 2.5, the random values r 1i are guaranteed to be distinct. Therefore, and as h(·) is a cryptographic hash function, ensuring collision resistance (see Section IV-B), it follows that the n hashes
in the sequence H = (..., h i , ...) are distinct, except with negligible probability. Since the hashes of h(·) are required to be uniformly distributed among the domain dom(h(·)) (see Section IV-B), the values in H are uniformly distributed among dom(h(·)) too. Since every player P i knows its random value r 1i of step 1.2 and r 1S , each P i also knows its unique corresponding hash h i ∈ H. The function sort(·) sorts a sequence in ascending order. Hence, the sequence H ′ = sort(H), computed in step 2.6 contains the same values as the sequence H but sorted in ascending order. Therefore, each player P i knows the position of its hash in the sorted list of hashes H ′ . This position is extracted with the function position(H ′ , h i ), which thus provides the correct index ρ i of P i 's hash h i in H ′ . Assume ρ i can be distinguished from a random element in {1, ..., n}. This implies that the permutation applied by the function sort(·) can be distinguished from a random permutation. Sorting a sequence of distinct random values produces a random permutation over the random input values [7] . According to the above assumption, if the result of sort(·) is distinguishable from a random permutation, then the result of h(·) is distinguishable from random values as well. However, as a cryptographically secure hash function is a random oracle, this contradicts the assumption of a random oracle. According to this contradiction, the random indices ρ i are computationally indistinguishable from values chosen uniformly at random from {1, ..., n}. Since the hashes in H, and therefore also the hashes in H ′ , are distinct, the n values ρ i ∈ {1, ..., n} are also distinct. Consequently, the ciphertext E 1 (x ′ ρi +r 2i ) selected from X ′ by player P i in step 2.7 based on ρ i is randomly and exclusively selected. The order of sequence X = (..., E ′ 1 (x ′ ρi ), ...) (step 2.10) is determined by the order in which the service provider receives the ciphertexts of steps 2.7 to 2.9 from the players. The ciphertext sent by P i encrypts some P j 's secret input chosen from a randomly permuted sequence based on its uniformly distributed, unique index ρ i . Hence, the order of encrypted inputs in X is randomly permuted. This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
B. Distinct Ciphertexts
Lemma 4 (Distinct Ciphertexts). The ciphertexts in sequence X = (..., E ′ 1 (x π(i) ), ...) output by the protocol SHUFFLE encrypt the same plaintexts x i as the ciphertexts in the input sequence X = (...,
, and cannot be mapped to each other by the service provider.
We prove Lemma 4 by showing that the operations performed on the uniquely and randomly selected ciphertexts change the ciphertexts without affecting their plaintexts.
Proof. In step 2.2, sequence X = (..., E 1 (x i ), ...) of the input ciphertexts is randomly permuted with a permutation π 2 and the underlying plaintexts are blinded with a random value r 2i , resulting in the sequence
Permutations only affect the order of a sequence's elements but not the elements themselves (see Section II). Hence, sequence X ′ contains encryptions of the original n plaintexts x i , blinded with n random values r 2i . In step 2.7, for each player P i with individual index ρ i (see Proof of Lemma 3), the ciphertext E 1 (x ′ i + r 2i ) ∈ X ′ is rerandomized by multiplication with E 1 (0). The result is the different ciphertext E ′ 1 (x ′ ρi + r 2ρ i ) = E 1 (x ′ i + r 2i ) of the same plaintext (see (10) ).
As the service provider knows the secret decryption key sk 2 , in step 2.10, it can decrypt the ciphertext E 2 (r 2ρi +r 3i ), negate it via multiplication by −1, and encrypt it with pk 1 . Multiplying the resulting ciphertext E 1 (−r 2ρi −r 3i ) with the ciphertexts of steps 2.7 and 2.9 yields the rerandomized, unblinded ciphertext
These rerandomized ciphertexts E ′ 1 (x ′ ρi ) form sequence X = (..., E ′ 1 (x ′ ρi ), ...). From (9), (10), and (11) , it follows that these ciphertexts encrypt the same plaintexts as the ciphertexts E 1 (x ′ ρi ) ∈ X ′ and therefore also the same plaintexts as the ciphertexts E 1 (x i ) ∈ X. From (10) , it follows that the rerandomized ciphertexts E ′ 1 (x i ) ∈ X and the non-rerandomized ciphertexts E 1 (x i ) ∈ X that encrypt the same secret input x i are different from each other, i.e., E ′ 1 (x 1 ) = E 1 (x 1 ), ..., E ′ 1 (x n ) = E 1 (x n ). As the service provider does not learn the probabilistic encryptions E 1 (0) used in step 2.7 for rerandomization, it cannot invert the rerandomization of the ciphertexts E 1 (x ′ ρi + r 2ρ i ). Consequently, the service provider cannot map the rerandomized ciphertexts in X to the original ciphertexts in X. This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
C. Secret Permutation
The overall permutation π applied during the protocol SHUFFLE consists of the following two composed, independent permutations.
• The permutation π 2 , applied by the service provider in step 2.2 to permute X ′ .
• The permutation which the players implicitly apply to the output sequence X by selecting a ciphertext E 1 (x ′ ρi + r 2ρ i ) based on their random indices. We denote it by π 3 . That leads to the overall permutation π(i) = π 3 (π 2 (i)). As there are two different kinds of participants, we prove secrecy of π separately for the players (Lemma 5) and for the service provider (Lemma 6).
Lemma 5
(Secret Permutation -Players). The protocol SHUFFLE computes the shuffled sequence X = (..., E ′ 1 (x π(i) ), ...) from the input sequence X = (..., E 1 (x i ), ...) based on a random permutation π such that no player learns the permutation π as long as there is no collusion between any player and the service provider.
Proof. Permutation π 2 is chosen at random by the service provider in step 2.2. Collusion between players and the service provider is excluded. Hence, π 2 cannot be reconstructed by the players from the sequence X ′ as they cannot recover their blinded secret inputs from the ciphertexts E 1 (x π2(i) +r 2i ) (see Proof of Lemma 1). Therefore, the players cannot learn the permutation π 2 , except with negligible probability. This completes the proof of Lemma 5.
Lemma 6 (Secret Permutation -Service Provider). The protocol SHUFFLE computes the shuffled sequence X = (..., E ′ 1 (x π(i) ), ...) from the input sequence X = (..., E 1 (x i ), ...) based on a random permutation π such that the service provider cannot learn the permutation π as long as there is no collusion between any player and the service provider.
Proof. The ciphertext sent by P i in step 2.7 is rerandomized (see Proof of Lemma 4) and encrypts some player P ρi 's secret input. It is chosen based on P i 's uniformly distributed, unique index ρ i . Therefore, the order of the encrypted (rerandomized) inputs in X computed in step 2.10 is randomly permuted by the permutation π 3 . The service provider cannot map the rerandomized ciphertexts of step 2.7 to those of sequence X ′ with probability better than guessing as it does not learn the probabilistic encryptions of 0, E 1 (0), and as the corresponding distributions are computationally indistinguishable (see Section II). Therefore, an inversion of this permutation is only possible given the players' indices ρ i , which are chosen uniformly at random (see Proof of Lemma 3). The service provider cannot decrypt the ciphertexts E 1 (r 1i ) of step 1.2 (see Proof of Lemma 2) and collusion between players and the service provider is excluded. Hence P S cannot compute the players' hashes of step 2.5 and it cannot compute the players' random indices. Therefore, the order of the ciphertexts in X is randomly permuted by π 3 , which can only be reconstructed by P S with negligible probability. This completes the proof of Lemma 6.
As the final step of our proof of secrecy of the permutation π, we show that the proofs of Lemmas 5 and 6 are sufficient to prove that no participant can learn the overall permutation π as long as there is no collusion between any player and the service provider, formalized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 7 (Secret Permutation). The protocol SHUFFLE computes the shuffled sequence X = (..., E ′ 1 (x π(i) ), ...) from the input sequence X = (..., E 1 (x i ), ...) based on a random permutation π. The permutation π is not known to any participant as long as there is no collusion between any player and the service provider.
Proof. To compute the composed permutation π, one needs to know both π 2 and π 3 . As both independent permutations π 2 and π 3 are random, so is their composition π. To show that no participant can learn π, it is sufficient to show that no single participant can learn both π 2 and π 3 . That is, for the composite permutation π to be private, at least one of the two permutations π 2 or π 3 needs to be private for each participant. The proof of Lemma 5 proves that none of the n players can learn π as long as there is no collusion between any player and the service provider. The proof of Lemma 6 proves that the service provider cannot learn π as long as there is no collusion between any player and the service provider. This concludes the proof of Theorem 7.
D. Summary
As the final step of our proof of correctness, we show that the proofs of Lemmas 3, 4, and 7 are sufficient to prove Theorem 2, i.e., Lemmas 3, 4, and 7 imply Theorem 2.
Proof. From the proof of Lemma 3, it follows that the ciphertexts in sequence X = (..., E ′ 1 (x π(i) ), ...) encrypting the plaintexts x i are permuted compared to the ciphertexts in sequence X = (..., E 1 (x i ), ...) with a random permutation π. According to the proof of Lemma 7, the permutation π is not known to any participant as long as there is no collusion between any player and the service provider. From the proof of Lemma 4, it follows that the ciphertexts in sequence X = (..., E ′ 1 (x π(i) ), ...) output by the protocol SHUFFLE encrypt Step Enc Dec Mult Message length 2.1 n · n · l C 1 2.2 n n n · n · l C 1 2.3 n n · n · l C 2 2.4 n · l M 1 2.10 n n 2 · n Total 3 · n n 3 · n 2 · n 2 · l C 1 + n 2 · l C 2 + n · l M 1 the same plaintexts x i as the ciphertexts in the input sequence X = (..., E 1 (x i ), ...). It also proves that the ciphertexts
The combination of these proofs shows that the protocol SHUFFLE performs a secret shuffle of the n players' encrypted inputs. For every sequence of ciphertexts X = (..., E 1 (x i ), ...) with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the protocol SHUFFLE yields as output a sequence X = (..., E ′ 1 (x π(i) ), ...) such that the ciphertexts E ′ 1 (x i ) = E 1 (x i ) have the same plaintexts x i . Their order in X is randomly permuted by a permutation π. This permutation is not known to any participant as long as there is no collusion between any player and the service provider. This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The performance evaluation of our protocol SHUFFLE is twofold: We first investigate its asymptotic computational, communication, and round complexity in a theoretical analysis. Then, we examine its performance in an empirical analysis and compare it to the performance of mix networks. Table I , the protocol consists of two rounds and a total of twelve protocol steps. Both values are independent of the number of players n. Therefore, the round complexity is constant in n, i.e., O(1).
A. Asymptotic Complexity 1) Round Complexity: As depicted in
2) Computational Complexity: We investigate the number of operations that need to be carried out by the service provider and each player, respectively. We restrict our considerations to the cryptographic operations encryption, decryption, and ciphertext multiplication as they can be assumed to be the most complex ones. Their numbers are given in the middle columns of Tables II and III. The resulting asymptotic computational complexity is O(n), i.e., linear in the number of players n, for both the service provider and each player.
3) Communication Complexity: To determine the communication complexity of the protocol, we investigate the length of the messages sent in each step of the protocol by the service provider and each player, respectively. These are given in the rightmost columns of Tables II and III. Here, l Mi and l Ci denote the maximum length of plaintexts in M i and ciphertexts in C i , respectively. The total asymptotic communication complexity of each player is O(n), i.e., linear in the number of 
players n. The service provider's communication complexity is O(n 2 ), i.e., quadratic in the number of players n. Compared to related work, such as [6] , our protocol has higher asymptotic communication complexity. However, we accept this loss as it helps reduce the computational complexity asymptotically.
B. Empirical Performance
To investigate the practical performance of the protocol, we implemented both the players' and the service provider's part of the protocol and deployed them in a cloud-computing setting. The service provider was implemented as a Java HttpServlet and deployed in a cloud-computing instance with 96 CPUs and 384 GB RAM. To emulate sufficiently large numbers of independent players, we implemented the players' protocol steps in a Java HttpServlet and deployed the players in a Kubernetes cluster based on a cloud-computing instance with 96 CPUs and 384 GB RAM. We instantiated one Kubernetes node per player and provided each node with one CPU and 4 GB RAM, which compares to the minimum requirements on a standard desktop computer. Therefore, we were able to emulate up to 96 players. Service provider and players were deployed in different data centers in two major European cities with a distance of approximately 650 kilometers to ensure a lifelike communication scenario. We used the additively homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem for CS 1 and CS 2 .
For comparison, we implemented a simple yet efficient reencryption mix network. Its construction is similar to the one described in [17] , but instead of the ElGamal cryptosystem with universal re-encryption, we used the standard version of Paillier's cryptosystem. Re-encryption (rerandomization) is performed given the public key of the players, which is a valid approach as the senders, i.e., players, in the shuffling scenario share the same key and the recipient, i.e., service provider, is not supposed to decrypt the received confidential data. We implemented the mixes as Java HttpServlets and deployed them in a similar cloud-computing setting as above, running each mix on an instance with 96 CPUs and 384 GB RAM. In a cascade of mixes, each mix receives all the messages at the same time in one batch, permutes and reencrypts them, and forwards the full batch to the next mix or the recipient. This matches the communication setting of the service provider having the mix network shuffle all the messages once it received the full list from the players. Fig. 2 : Results of the Empirical Performance Analysis Fig. 2a depicts the execution time t relatively to the number of messages n for 1024-bit keys for our shuffling protocol and for mix networks with cascades of three and five mixes, respectively. Shuffling 96 inputs with out shuffling protocol took 2.08 seconds while the mix networks performed shuffling in 0.51 and 0.80 seconds, respectively. For 2048-bit keys, shuffling 96 inputs took 9.69 seconds with our protocol and 2.71 and 4.53 seconds with mix networks (see Fig. 2b ). For both key lengths, the execution time of our shuffling protocol grows linearly in the number of players. Most importantly, the empirical results show that a mix network of five mixes with appropriate key length is only 2.14 times faster than our shuffling protocol. However, recall that to achieve this performance, mix networks require multiple independent servers to perform the mixing whereas our shuffling protocol requires only a single server. Given the linear nature of re-encryption mix networks, one can reasonably assume that our protocol performs similar to a mix network of ten to eleven mixes. Furthermore, the linear growth of the execution time of our shuffling protocol indicates that the overall effect of the communication complexity being quadratic in n is minor. To further support this assumption, we investigated the ratio of computation time to communication time (see Fig. 2c ). For growing n, the ratio of our protocol shows logarithmic trend. Besides that, its computation percentage is only a fraction of the computation percentage of the mix networks, which implies a smaller demand for computing power.
C. Summary
Our protocol has constant round complexity and linear computational complexity. Our empirical performance analysis shows that the execution time is linear in n. This implies that the fact that the communication complexity of our shuffling protocol is quadratic in n, only has a minor impact on the overall execution time. In this analysis, shuffling 96 secret inputs encrypted under a 2048 bits long Paillier key took 9.69 seconds, which proves the practicability of our secret shuffling protocol. Performing shuffling via a mix network of five mixes takes roughly half as long. However, such a mix network requires five independent, powerful servers, each of which performs O(n) cryptographic operations and therefore consumes an amount of energy that is linear in n. Furthermore, the much smaller percentage of time required for computation relatively to communication in our shuffling protocol indicates generally lower cloud-computing costs and lower energy consumption. Therefore, we consider our secret shuffling protocol as a valuable alternative to mix networks.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We present an efficient secure multi-party protocol for shuffling encrypted data. It precludes any mapping between ciphertexts in the unshuffled and the shuffled sequence with probability better than guessing. We prove correctness of our shuffling functionality and privacy of the confidential inputs. Key element of our contribution is a novel approach to efficient random index distribution, which provides the random, secret permutation. The shuffling protocol has computational complexity linear in the number of players as well as constant round complexity. It shuffles 96 ciphertexts in 9.69 seconds for 2048 bit long keys. We show that the effect of the communication complexity on the execution time is minor, which ensures good scalability. Our shuffling protocol performs asymptotically better than previous MPCbased shuffling approaches that focus on low communication complexity but suffer from higher computational complexity, which has negative impact on scalability. Furthermore, its execution time is only 2.14 times that of a mix network of five mixes but requires no additional, independent servers. This not only enables use cases with centralized communication scenarios, but also causes much lower cloud-computing costs. Being a general-purpose protocol, it can be used in a variety of applications such as privacy-preserving benchmarking systems, anonymous surveys, polls, voting, and many more.
IX. FUTURE WORK
The protocol's applicability could be further improved by reducing its communication complexity. This can be achieved with a more efficient approach to obtaining the input ciphertexts from the service provider and selecting one of unique, random index. Moreover, it could be modified to be secure against malicious adversaries [26] . In a more generic version, m encrypted inputs could be present on the service-provider side prior to the protocol execution instead of being provided by the n players. The n players could then shuffle the m values. Further security analysis is necessary to investigate the implications of setting n ≪ m where players generate multiple random indices and select and rerandomize multiple ciphertexts at once. This would further decrease the communication complexity and improve scalability of the protocol.
